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I. Introduction 
 A well-known method of testing or validating econometric models (whether structural or 
otherwise) is to examine their performance in out of sample prediction. That is, given a change in 
the policy environment, do the key endogenous variables of the model move in ways that are in 
some sense “reasonably close” to the model’s forecasts? Unfortunately however, as noted by 
Keane and Wolpin (2007), the examination of models’ predictive validity is not especially 
common in the micro-econometrics literature. 
 A common feature of structural econometric models is that latent variables, not actually 
incorporated in the likelihood or statistical objective function used to fit the model, are key 
determinants of agents’ behavior. For example, in Keane and Wolpin (2001), the level of 
parental transfers to college-aged youth is a key driver of college attendance decisions. Yet 
parental transfers were not actually used in the estimation of the model as they are not observed 
in the NLSY data the authors use. Instead they remain a latent variable that is inferred from 
income, changes in assets, etc. Changes in the policy regime affect college attendance in part 
through their effect on transfers. Keane and Wolpin (2001) can examine whether policy changes 
affect college attendance in the way their model predicts, but they cannot directly test the policy-
to-transfers-to-behavior mechanism embedded in the model as transfers are not observed. 
 Here, we propose that another approach to validating structural econometric models is to 
seek evidence that such latent behavioral mechanisms inherent in a model are in fact operative. 
Of course, this requires collecting data on the relevant latent variable(s).1   
 We present an example of this idea motivated by Khwaja (2001). He develops a 
structural model of health over the life cycle, incorporating sequential (bi-annual) decisions 
about health insurance, health investments (via preventive care and healthy or unhealthy 
behaviors) and medical treatment. He estimates the model using the U.S. Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS). Simulation of the model generates the rather surprising result that provision of 
subsidized (or even free) health insurance would not cause people to engage more in unhealthy 
or risky behaviors like drinking and smoking, or less in healthy behaviors like exercise. This runs 
counter to the traditional “moral hazard” story in static models of insurance, where insurance 
induces people to engage in more risky behaviors. 
                                                 
1 Keane and Wolpin (2001) did examine historical data on transfers from other sources, and they argue that 
qualitatively it follows the patterns predicted by their model. But the additional data was inadequate to directly test 
the policy-to-transfers-to-schooling behavioral mechanism.   
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 The key point is that, in a dynamic model, more generous insurance can increase life 
expectancy, as a better insured person can afford more preventive care and better treatment 
should he/she become sick. Increased life expectancy, in turn, enhances one’s incentive to invest 
in health. Technically, the reason is that, in any dynamic model, a longer planning horizon (i.e., 
in this case, life-span) increases returns to investment. More intuitively, if one expects to live 
longer, it creates an incentive to invest in health to enhance quality of life in old age.2 This 
dynamic effect counteracts the moral hazard effect of insurance on investment in health. 
 We call the mechanism whereby greater life expectancy increases investment in health 
the “Mickey Mantle effect,” after the great Yankee slugger of the 1950s and 60s. Mantle (1931-
1995) was legendary for having perhaps the greatest natural talent of any baseball player. But a 
string of serious injuries, combined with heavy drinking and serious disregard for his health, 
ended his career prematurely. After years of alcoholism leading ultimately to liver failure, 
Mantle finally died of cancer at the age of 63. He explained his reckless behavior by noting that 
he never expected to live past his early 40s, as most males in his father’s line had died young due 
to Hodgkin’s disease.3 He was surprised to live into his 60s, and is widely attributed the quote: 
“If I knew I was going to live this long, I’d have taken better care of myself.”4    
 Khwaja’s model predicts that if we could observe the latent variable life expectancy, then 
we should see the Mantle effect – a ceteris paribus positive effect of life expectancy on 
investment in health. If this effect were not present, it would cast serious doubt on the validity of 
the model, while if it is present we would gain additional confidence in the model.  
The HRS does collect data on subjective life expectancy. Our goal is to look for evidence 
of the Mantle effect using these data, by estimating health investment decision rules including 
life expectancy.5 Of course, the problem we face is that life expectancy is potentially endogenous 
in the decision rule for investment in health, for two reasons. First, there is a reverse causality: 
greater investment in health should increase life expectancy, ceteris paribus. Second, there is the 
                                                 
2 On the other hand, the expectation of greater longevity can also reduce the marginal value of additional years of 
life, a mechanism that would reduce investment in health. In Khwaja’s model the investment increasing effects of a 
greater expected life span dominate.  
3 Mantle’s father died of Hodgkin’s disease at age 39, while his two uncles died at 32 and 41. Of Mantle’s four sons, 
one died of Hodgkin’s disease a year before Mantle (at age 36), while the other died of cancer in 2000. Mantle’s two 
surviving sons are active in the Mickey Mantle Foundation, which promotes organ donations. 
4 This could be viewed as ex post rationalization, but Mantle made related statements in his youth. For instance, as a 
rookie he told the Yankee player representative: “You don't have to talk to me about pensions. I won't be around 
long enough to collect one.” 
5 In principle, Khwaja might have used these data in estimation, but modeling expectations entails great difficulties. 
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problem of omitted variables. For example, the Mantle mechanism implies that health itself 
influences investment, as a healthier person would, ceteris paribus, expect to live longer and 
therefore have a greater return to investments that increase quality of life in old age. Thus, failure 
to adequately control for an individual’s health could create spurious correlation between life 
expectancy and health investment. In addition, there is also the problem that survey questions 
presumably measure subjective life expectancy with considerable error. 
We deal with these problems by instrumenting for subjective life expectancy. Motivated 
by the Mantle story, we use as instruments information on the ages at death of respondents’ 
parents (or their current ages if still alive). The idea is that these variables capture an influence 
on peoples’ subjective life expectancy that is independent of their health status, or other factors 
such as income or the price of medical care or insurance.6  
To clarify the nature of the problem, suppose that investments in health, life expectancy, 
the level of health and insurance choice are determined by the following system of equations, 
which can be viewed as a simple schematic representation of Khwaja’s model: 
 
(A) Investment in health = f(lagged health, price of investment in health, income,  
taste for health, life expectancy) 
   
(B) Life expectancy = g(lagged health, price of health care, investment in health,  
environmental risk factors, genetics) 
 
(C) Current health = h(lagged health, investment in health, environmental risk factors,  
genetics, exogenous shocks to health) 
 
(D) Insurance coverage = I(lagged health, insurance plan options, income, risk aversion, taste  
for health, tastes for insurance plan options)   
 
Our interest is in estimating equation (A). Assume the error term in (A) arises because (i) the 
“taste for health” variable and (ii) some part of lagged health are unobserved. According to 
equation (B), life expectancy is affected by one’s rate of investment in health. Thus, life 
expectancy is endogenous in (A), because a person with (i) a high unobserved taste for health 
and/or (ii) a higher than observed level of lagged health will tend to have both a high rate of 
investment in health and a high life expectancy (creating spurious correlation).   
                                                 
6 After completing this work we became aware of a recent paper by Bloom, Canning, Moore and Song (2006) that 
uses similar instruments to estimate effects of life expectancy on saving and the timing of retirement. 
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A valid instrument for life expectancy in (A) is a variable that affects investment in 
health only through its affect on life expectancy (and not through any other channel). In the 
system (A)-(D), one’s genetic health endowment plays this role. Thus, as suggested by the 
Mantle story, one way to generate an instrument is to obtain data on congenital family diseases, 
or proxy for the genetic endowment using parents’ age at death.7, 8 The key identifying 
assumption here is that investment is conditionally mean independent of the genetic health 
endowment, given the controls in (A) – i.e., life expectancy, measured health, income, prices.   
Note that the variables “price of investments in health” in (A) and “price of health care” 
in (B) depend on prices of alcohol and tobacco, proximity to and cost of healthy food, proximity 
to athletic facilities, etc., as well as insurance coverage. We do not measure these variables 
directly, but instead proxy for them using time and region dummies (determinants of prices) and 
variables like education, income and risk tolerance (which drive insurance coverage).9  
 
II. Description of the HRS Data   
Our data come from the first six waves (1992-2002) of the HRS, which began as a 
panel study of the 1931 through 1941 U.S. birth cohorts (see www.hrsonline.isr.umich.edu). 
Participants have been interviewed every two years since 1992. Individuals in the first wave 
range from 51 to 61 years of age; spouses received an identical interview and could be of any 
age. In 1998 new cohorts born between 1942 and 1947 were added to the sample. We restrict 
our sample to persons age 51 to 65 at the time of the interview. For this age group we use 
information on all individuals and years with complete information.10 Our dependent variables 
                                                 
7 A possible problem is that a family history of congenital disease might affect one’s investment in health through 
other channels (e.g., due to having fewer financial resources in youth if parents were ill). However, it can be 
plausibly argued that this problem is resolved by conditioning on current health status in (A), as this would control 
for effects of family background on prior investments in health. 
8 According to the framework (A)-(D), measures of environmental risk factors are also potential instruments. Living 
in a risky environment may reduce life expectancy, but conditional on life expectancy it should not affect investment 
in health directly. Of course, this assumes that risky environment is not endogenous in the sense that people with 
low tastes for health will also choose to live in a risky environment. 
9 Insurance coverage may tend to be correlated with unobserved tastes for health. Thus, there may be a selection bias 
whereby people with greater taste for health also have more comprehensive insurance (and hence, a lower cost of 
investment in health). In that case, consistent estimation of (A) would require us to deal with this selection problem. 
That in turn, would require estimating (A) jointly with the choice model for insurance coverage in (D). 
10 In the HRS wave 1-6, there were 56,567 observations in the 51-65 age range. Of these, 7,564 were dropped 
because of missing information on longevity expectations, 3,087 because of missing information on age and death of 
parents, 1,557 because they had not answered the question about risk aversion. In addition 26 observations had 
missing information on education, 48 on birth region, and 38 had non-responses to questions on worsening of health 
conditions, giving an analysis sample of 44,238. There are 275 missing observations for the smoking question. 
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include binary indicators for whether a respondent currently smokes, drinks heavily (average 
consumption of 3 or more drinks per day), or is obese (Body Mass Index > 30). Our analysis 
sample contains 44,238 observations (which is reduced to 43,963 in the case of the smoking 
regression, as this variable is missing for 275 respondents).  
Our measure of subjective life expectancy is the answer to a question about the percent 
chance a respondent will live to age 75 or more. Prior studies have shown that such longevity 
probabilities are generally good predictors of actual longevity (see Hurd and McGarry (1995, 
2002), Smith, Taylor and Sloan (2001) and Khwaja, Sloan and Chung (2005)). Control 
variables include the respondents’ age, gender, race (black vs. not black), ethnicity (Hispanic 
vs. not Hispanic), and marital status, household income, net household wealth, education, and 
indicators for whether the respondents’ father and mother had high school degrees.  We also 
include a measure of respondents’ degree of relative risk aversion, based on a question about 
the willingness to accept a lifetime income gamble (see Barsky et al. (1997)).11  
We control for health using a detailed list of health indicators. These include indicators 
of self-assessed health (i.e., excellent, very good or better, good or better, or fair or better), as 
well as a large number of objective measures, such as: whether the respondent had a recent 
overnight stay in a hospital, the number of limitations in activities of daily living (ADLs),12 and 
binary indicators for whether the respondent was ever diagnosed with hypertension, diabetes, 
cancer, lung disease, heart problems, stroke, mental disease, or arthritis/rheumatism. We also 
include a number of variables measuring changes in health status since the last interview, such 
as the change in self-reported health status, whether there was a first diagnosis of any of the 
conditions listed above, and, if the respondent already had one of these physician-diagnosed 
medical conditions, whether the condition got worse. Finally, we include binary variables set to 
one if any of the health measures is missing. 
Our instruments include the age at death of respondents’ parents (or their current age if 
still alive), as well as age2, age3 and binary indicators of whether the father or mother died at an 
age that fell in the range of  <65, 66 to 70, 71 to 75, 76 to 80, 81 to 85, or 86+.  
Table 1 contains a complete list of variables used in the analysis, along with means and 
standard deviations. 58% of respondents are female. The average age is 58 and 65% expect to 
                                                 
11 This question was not asked of all respondents in all waves. If a current response was not available, we used the 
last available answer. 
12 ADLs are whether the individual is able to independently walk, dress, bathe, eat, get into bed, and use the toilet. 
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live to age 75+. 78% report being in good or better health, while 49% report very good or better. 
The average age at death of respondents’ mothers is 74.4 while that of fathers was 70.7.13 
 
III. Empirical Results 
Given the large number of health measures, it is difficult to interpret their coefficients in 
regressions for life expectancy or for health investment. Thus, we conducted the factor analysis 
described in Table 2. We decided to keep the first 4 factors, which together explain the bulk of 
the covariance amongst the health indicators. The first factor, which is by far the most important, 
is a poor health factor with substantial negative loadings on self-reported health and substantial 
positive loadings on all the physician diagnosed conditions. Factors 2 through 4 are all positive 
health factors whose interpretation is much subtler.14  
Table 3 reports the 1st stage results from our two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure. 
The dependent variable is our measure of life expectancy – the expected probability of living to 
age 75+. The first column reports results using the 4 health factors, while the second column 
includes all the separate health indicators from Table 1. We reports results only for the sub-
sample used in the smoking analysis (N=43,963) as the results for the full sample used in the 
heavy drinking and high-BMI analysis are almost identical.  
Clearly, health Factor 1 is a far more important determinant of life expectancy than the 
other factors. A one standard deviation increase in (poor) health Factor 1 reduces expected 
probability of living to age 75+ by (-11.058)(.862)= 9.5 percentage points. Women’s subjective 
probability of living to 75+ is about 3.5 points greater than men, ceteris paribus, while that for 
Blacks is almost 7 points greater than for whites. An additional 4 years of education raises this 
probability more than 2 points. Interestingly, marriage and assets are not significant and income, 
while significant, has a very small effect. The point estimates imply that roughly a 300 thousand 
dollar increase in annual income is needed to raise the subjective probability by just 1 point. 
The parental age at death variables have large and significant effects in the expected 
direction. For instance, having a father whose age at death was 65 or less reduces the subjective 
probability of living to 75+ by 6.6 percentage points, ceteris paribus. The F-test for the joint 
significance of the parental age at death variables is 23.19 in column (1) and 24.06 in column (2). 
                                                 
13 These figures include current age for parents who are still alive (36% of mothers and 13% of fathers).   
14 Factors 2 and 3 load positively on self-reported health but also load positively on stroke indicators. But while 2 
loads negatively on the change in self-reported health, 3 loads positively. Factor 4 loads positively on self-reported 
health and negatively on hypertension and diabetes indicators. But it also loads positively on ADL limitations. 
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 Table 4 reports OLS regressions of our three health investment measures (smoking, 
heavy drinking and high-BMI) on our life expectancy measure (the subjective probability of 
living to age 75+) along with an extensive set of controls for socio-demographics and health. The 
OLS results seem to provide some modest support for the Mantle effect. For instance, in the 
smoking regressions in columns (1)-(2), the subjective probability of living to age 75+ has t- 
statistics in the 9 to 10 range. The point estimates imply that a 10-percentage point increase in 
this subjective probability reduces the probability of smoking by about 1 percentage point.  
Point estimates for heavy drinking are highly significant, but an order of magnitude 
smaller. However, the percent of respondents who report heavy drinking is also an order of 
magnitude smaller than that who report smoking (see Table 1), so in percentage terms the effect 
on behavior is similar. For high-BMI our results are not significant, statistically or quantitatively. 
Table 5 reports our main IV results using parents’ age at death as the instruments for life 
expectancy. Here, the results are mixed. Those for smoking in columns (1)-(2) seem to provide 
strong support for the Mantle effect. Subjective life expectancy is highly significant, and the 
point estimates imply that OLS greatly understates the strength of the effect. Specifically, they 
imply that, ceteris paribus, a 10-percentage point increase in subjective probability of living to 
age 75+ reduces the probability of smoking by about 2.3 to 2.7 percentage points. As the percent 
of respondents who smoke is 22.6% (see Table 1) these represent decreases of 10 to 12%. 
In contrast, for heavy drinking we obtain point estimates that are insignificant and of the 
wrong sign. The evidence for high-BMI is mixed. The point estimates are quantitatively fairly 
large (at least half as great as for smoking) and of the right sign, but just barely significant at the 
5% level in column (5) and not significant in column (6).            
 
IV. Conclusion 
We have argued that testing the latent mechanisms of structural models, independent of 
full-blown structural estimation, can be a valuable model validation tool. This perspective has 
the benefit that it can potentially rationalize much of the descriptive or IV-based empirical work 
being done in economics as contributing to the structural research program. As a specific 
example of this idea, we attempt to find evidence for the “Mantle effect” that plays a key role in 
Khwaja’s (2001) structural model of investment in health. We find clear evidence for the effect 
with respect to smoking, but mixed evidence with respect to heavy drinking and high-BMI. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Dependent Variables 
  
   Smoking 0.226 0.418 
   Heavy Drinking 0.034 0.183 
   High BMI 0.269 0.443 
   
Explanatory Variables   
   Subjective probability of living to age 75+   65.182 29.063 
   Female 0.579 0.493 
   Black 0.146 0.354 
   Hispanic     0.075 0.264 
   Age 58.159 3.927 
   Years of education 12.466 2.981 
   Married 0.731 0.443 
   Household income (in 1,000 USD) 58.034 95.760 
   Household wealth  (in 1,000 USD) 295.961 882.010 
   Risk tolerance 0.242 0.143 
   Father has high school degree 0.441 0.496 
   Mother has high school degree 0.458 0.498 
   
Health Indicators   
   Self reported health excellent 0.182 0.386 
   Self reported health very good or better 0.492 0.499 
   Self reported health good or better 0.782 0.412 
   Self reported health fair or better 0.932 0.250 
   Change in self reported health (1=better, 5=worse)  2.950 0.852 
   Number of ADL limitations 0.151 0.581 
   Change in number of ADL limitations 0.027 0.473 
   Hospital stay in last two years 0.171 0.376 
   Hypertension diagnosis ever 0.396 0.489 
   Diabetes diagnosis ever   0.115 0.320 
   Cancer diagnosis ever 0.070 0.255 
   Lung disease diagnosis ever 0.069 0.255 
   Heart problems diagnosis ever 0.136 0.342 
   Stroke diagnosis ever 0.032 0.176 
   Mental diseases diagnosis ever 0.112 0.316 
   Arthritis diagnosis ever 0.445 0.497 
   Hypertension first diagnosis last 2 years 0.032 0.176 
   Diabetes first diagnosis last 2 years 0.016 0.125 
   Cancer first diagnosis last 2 years 0.012 0.109 
   Lung disease first diagnosis last 2 years 0.010 0.099 
   Heart problem first diagnosis last 2 years 0.019 0.136 
   Stroke first diagnosis last 2 years 0.006 0.077 
   Mental disease first diagnosis last 2 years 0.015 0.122 
   Arthritis first diagnosis last 2 years 0.044 0.206 
   Hypertension worse 0.009 0.098 
   Diabetes worse 0.007 0.085 
   Cancer worse 0.001 0.037 
   Lung disease worse 0.007 0.088 
   Heart problems worse  0.007 0.085 
   Mental disease worse  0.005 0.076 
 10
   Stroke remaining problems worse 0.009 0.097 
   Health status variable missing 0.003 0.057 
   Change in health variable missing 0.037 0.189 
   
Health Factors§   
   Health factor 1 -0.050 0.861 
   Health factor 2  -0.041 0.732 
   Health factor 3 0.037 0.720 
   Health factor 4 -0.005 0.699 
   
Instrumental Variables   
   Age of mother+ 74.37 13.43 
   Age of father+ 70.67 14.035 
   Mother age at death ≤ 65 0.200 0.400 
   Mother age at death 66 to 70 0.070 0.256 
   Mother age at death 71 to 75 0.096 0.295 
   Mother age at death 76 to 80 0.100 0.300 
   Mother age at death 81 to 85 0.098 0.297 
   Mother age at death > 85 0.079 0.271 
   Father age at death ≤ 65    0.312 0.463 
   Father age at death 66 to 70  0.112 0.315 
   Father age at death 71 to 75 0.137 0.344 
   Father age at death 76 to 80 0.121 0.327 
   Father age at death 81 to 85 0.101 0.301 
   Father age at death > 85  0.082 0.274 
   
Number of observations++ 43,963  
§ The four health factors are constructed from the health indicators via factor analysis (see 
Table 2).  
+ Age is either current age or age at death. 36% of mothers and 13% of fathers are still alive. 
++ Sample statistics refer to the sample used in the smoking regression. 
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Table 2: Factor Loadings for the Health Variables 
 
Variable Health 
factor 1 
Health 
factor 2 
Health 
factor 3 
Health 
factor 4 
  
Self reported health excellent 
 
-0.371 
 
0.085 
 
0.169 
 
0.237 
Self reported health very good or better -0.576 0.089 0.221 0.224 
Self reported health good or better -0.680 0.044 0.170 0.012 
Self reported health fair or better -0.576 -0.010 0.084 -0.176 
Change in self reported health (1 to 5) 0.384 -0.510 0.425 0.019 
Number of ADL limitations (0 to 6) 0.557 0.112 0.050 0.406 
Change in number of ADL limitations 0.256 0.064 0.098 0.392 
Hospital stay in last two years 0.411 0.049 -0.055 -0.050 
Hypertension diagnosis ever 0.325 -0.008 -0.057 -0.224 
Diabetes diagnosis ever   0.348 -0.003 -0.065 -0.261 
Cancer diagnosis ever 0.138 -0.050 -0.115 0.028 
Lung disease diagnosis ever 0.341 -0.079 -0.119 0.187 
Heart problems diagnosis ever 0.404 0.009 -0.096 -0.134 
Stroke diagnosis ever 0.369 0.462 0.380 -0.143 
Mental diseases diagnosis ever 0.373 -0.026 -0.103 0.107 
Arthritis diagnosis ever 0.327 -0.106 -0.080 -0.042 
Hypertension first diagnosis last 2 years 0.087 -0.043 0.015 -0.095 
Diabetes first diagnosis last 2 years 0.139 -0.042 -0.022 -0.184 
Cancer first diagnosis last 2 years 0.116 -0.063 -0.073 0.012 
Lung disease first diagnosis last 2 years 0.169 -0.061 -0.051 0.112 
Heart problem first diagnosis last 2 years 0.197 -0.032 -0.037 -0.113 
Stroke first diagnosis last 2 years 0.244 0.326 0.330 -0.084 
Mental disease first diagnosis last 2 years 0.182 -0.027 -0.020 0.067 
Arthritis first diagnosis last 2 years 0.074 -0.071 0.017 -0.035 
Hypertension worse 0.193 -0.022 0.036 0.021 
Diabetes worse 0.195 -0.034 0.009 -0.023 
Cancer worse 0.063 -0.025 -0.022 0.021 
Lung disease worse 0.217 -0.052 -0.016 0.161 
Heart problems worse  0.239 0.018 0.045 0.028 
Mental disease worse  0.192 -0.015 0.010 0.113 
Stroke remaining problems worse 0.315 0.431 0.379 -0.082 
Health status variable missing 0.043 0.146 -0.162 0.038 
Change in health variable missing -0.078 0.556 -0.526 0.066 
     
Eigenvalue 3.405 1.179 1.088 0.802 
Note: For ease of interpretation, the more important negative loadings on good health indicators (or 
positive loadings on poor health measures) are highlighted in red. Similarly, the more important positive 
loadings on good health indicators (or negative loadings on bad health indicators) are highlighted in blue.   
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Table 3: 1st Stage IV Regression Results: Predicting Life Expectancy§ 
 
Dependent Variable: Subjective probability of living to age 75+ 
 
Independent Variable 
(1) 
Health factors 
(2)+ 
Health variables 
Female 3.747*** 
(0.395) 
3.497*** 
(0.395) 
Black 6.678*** 
(0.647) 
6.865*** 
(0.644) 
Hispanic     -3.904*** 
(0.934) 
-3.523*** 
(0.932) 
Age 0.392*** 
(0.050) 
0.365*** 
(0.051) 
Years of education 0.652*** 
(0.075) 
0.558*** 
(0.075) 
Married 0.688 
(0.443) 
0.643 
(0.437) 
Health factor 1 -11.058*** 
(0.242) 
 
Health factor 2 0.693*** 
(0.228) 
 
Health factor 3 2.720*** 
(0.233) 
 
Health factor 4 0.662*** 
(0.258) 
 
Household income (in 1,000 USD) 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Household wealth  (in 1,000 USD) 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Risk tolerance -0.394 
(1.311) 
-0.462 
(1.296) 
Father has high school degree 0.625 
(0.448) 
0.622 
(0.442) 
Mother has high school degree 1.033** 
(0.454) 
0.992** 
(0.449) 
Mother age at death ≤ 65++ -7.288*** 
(1.404) 
-7.487*** 
(1.393) 
Mother age at death 66 to 70 -4.856*** 
(1.049) 
-4.986*** 
(1.037) 
Mother age at death 71 to 75 -3.505*** 
(0.803) 
-3.556*** 
(0.794) 
Mother age at death 76 to 80 -3.112*** 
(0.706) 
-3.116*** 
(0.699) 
Mother age at death 81 to 85 0.103 
(0.631) 
0.138 
(0.622) 
Mother age at death > 85 -0.824 
(0.746) 
-0.840 
(0.734) 
Father age at death ≤ 65++    -6.623*** 
(1.532) 
-6.628*** 
(1.509) 
Father age at death 66 to 70  -3.933*** 
(1.124) 
-3.919*** 
(1.111) 
Father age at death 71 to 75 -3.391*** 
(0.902) 
-3.363*** 
(0.892) 
Father age at death 76 to 80 -1.349** 
(0.771) 
-1.310* 
(0.763) 
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Father age at death 81 to 85 0.025 
(0.695) 
0.013 
(0.686) 
Father age at death > 85  0.905 
(0.792) 
0.835 
(0.786) 
Age of mother+++ -0.609 
(0.542) 
-0.497 
(0.541) 
Age of mother ^ 2 0.005 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
Age of mother ^ 3 0.00001 
(0.00004) 
>-0.00001 
(0.00004) 
Age of father+++ -0.339 
(0.622) 
-0.311 
(0.614) 
Age of father ^ 2 0.001 
(0.010) 
0.0007 
(0.010) 
Age of father ^ 3 0.00001 
(0.00005) 
0.00001 
(0.00005) 
F-test for age polynomials 10.07 9.90 
R-squared 0.177 0.187 
Partial R-squared (identifying instruments) 0.021 0.022 
F-test for excluded instruments 23.19 24.06 
Observations 43,963 43,963 
*  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Huber-White standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level 
Coefficients for wave fixed effects and birth region are included but not shown. 
§    The table reports the 1st stage results for the sample used in the smoking 
regression. The 1st stage results for heavy drinking and high BMI are very similar, 
as the sample size is only reduced to 44,238. 
+  All the health indicators in Table 1 are included in the regression in column 2, but 
the coefficients are not shown. 
++ The omitted categories for the father and mother age at death dummies are 
mother still alive and father still alive.  
+++ Age in the age polynomials is either current age or age at death. 
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Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
 
 Smoking Heavy drinking High BMI 
  
(1)  
Health 
factors 
 
(2) + 
Health 
variables 
 
(3) 
Health 
factors 
 
(4) + 
Health 
variables 
 
(5)  
Health 
factors 
 
(6) + 
Health 
variables 
Subj. Prob. of living 
to age 75+ 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.00006 
(0.0001) 
Female -0.046*** 
(0.007) 
-0.049*** 
(0.007) 
-0.055*** 
(0.003) 
-0.057*** 
(0.003) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.007) 
Black -0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.107*** 
(0.012) 
0.076** 
(0.012) 
Hispanic     -0.98*** 
(0.016) 
-0.091*** 
(0.015) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.043*** 
(0.016) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
Age -0.008*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.008*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.008*** 
(0.0008) 
Years of education -0.016*** 
(0.001) 
-0.014*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Married -0.110*** 
(0.008) 
-0.107*** 
(0.008) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
Health factor 1 0.015*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.002** 
(0.001) 
 0.082*** 
(0.004) 
 
Health factor 2 -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.002** 
(0.001) 
 -0.012*** 
(0.003) 
 
Health factor 3 -0.009** 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.040*** 
(0.004) 
 
Health factor 4 0.025*** 
(0.004) 
 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 0.061** 
(0.004) 
 
Household income 
(in 1,000 USD) 
-0.00009*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
<0.00001 
(0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(0.00001) 
-0.00004 
(0.00003) 
-0.00003 
(0.00003) 
Household wealth  
(in 1,000 USD) 
-0.00001*** 
(<0.00001) 
-0.00001*** 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
Risk tolerance 0.068*** 
(0.024) 
0.066*** 
(0.023) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.020** 
(0.0009) 
-0.042* 
(0.024) 
-0.033 
(0.023) 
Father has high 
school degree 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.0009 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.018** 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
Mother has high 
school degree 
0.0002 
(0.008) 
-0.0002 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.0006 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
R – squared 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 
Observations 43,963 43,963 44,238 44,238 44,238 44,238 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Huber-White standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level. 
Wave fixed effects and birth region dummies are included but their coefficients are not shown. 
+ All the health indicators listed in Table 1 are included, but their coefficients are not shown. 
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Table 5: IV Regression Results: 2nd Stage 
 
 Smoking Heavy drinking High BMI 
  
(1) 
Health 
factors 
 
(2) + 
Health 
variables 
 
(3) 
Health 
factors 
 
(4) + 
Health 
variables 
 
(5) 
Health 
factors 
 
(6) + 
Health 
variables 
Subj. Prob. of living 
to age 75+ 
-0.0023** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0027*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0012 
(0.0009) 
Female -0.041*** 
(0.008) 
-0.043*** 
(0.008) 
-0.058*** 
(0.003) 
-0.059*** 
(0.003) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
Black -0.022* 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.120*** 
(0.013) 
0.085*** 
(0.013) 
Hispanic     -0.102*** 
(0.016) 
-0.097*** 
(0.016) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.035** 
(0.017) 
0.031* 
(0.016) 
Age -0.008*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.007*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.007*** 
(0.0009) 
Years of education -0.015*** 
(0.001) 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0061 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Married -0.109*** 
(0.008) 
-0.106*** 
(0.008) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
Health factor 1 -0.001 
(0.011) 
 0.004 
(0.004) 
 0.059*** 
(0.011) 
 
Health factor 2 -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.003** 
(0.001) 
 -0.010*** 
(0.004) 
 
Health factor 3 -0.005 
(0.004) 
 0.0003 
(0.001) 
 -0.035*** 
(0.004) 
 
Health factor 4 -0.026*** 
(0.004) 
 0.003** 
(0.001) 
 -0.060*** 
(0.004) 
 
Household income 
(in 1,000 USD) 
-0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(0.00001) 
-0.00003 
(0.00003) 
-0.00003 
(0.00003) 
Household wealth  
(in 1,000 USD) 
-0.00001*** 
(<0.00001) 
-0.00001*** 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
<0.00001 
(<0.00001) 
Risk tolerance 0.068*** 
(0.024) 
0.065*** 
(0.024) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.042* 
(0.024) 
-0.033 
(0.023) 
Father has high 
school degree 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.0005 
(0.003) 
0.0007 
(0.003) 
-0.017* 
(0.008) 
-0.018** 
(0.008) 
Mother has high 
school degree 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.08 
Hansen J – Statistic 
(P – value) 
13.542 
(0.699) 
14.300 
(0.645) 
24.135 
(0.115) 
23.690 
(0.128) 
20.038 
(0.272) 
20.328 
(0.257) 
Observations 43,963 43,963 44,238 44,238 44,238 44,238 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Huber-White standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level. 
Wave fixed effects and birth region dummies are included but their coefficients are not shown. 
+ All the health indicators listed in Table 1 are included, but their coefficients are not shown. 
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